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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Markcus Raymond May appeals from the judgment of conviction, arguing that the 
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On May 29, 2010, in Buhl, Idaho, May stopped his car in front of his ex-
girlfriend's house, identified and approached her new boyfriend, James Lambert, 
leveled a gun at his chest, and pulled the trigger. (R., pp.29-30.) The gun misfired, and 
Mr. Lambert fled as May loaded another round into the chamber and gave chase. (R., 
pp.31-32.) May fired an additional four shots at Mr. Lambert, one of which struck him in 
the leg. (Id.) Mr. Lambert ran into his girlfriend's house to hide, locking the front door 
behind him. (R., p.32.) May broke the front door's window, reached in to unlock it, then 
followed Mr. Lambert and his girlfriend to the back bedroom where they had barricaded 
themselves into the room. (Id.) May gouged the door three times with a pry-bar, and 
then fled the scene when his ex-girlfriend told him that she had called the police. (Id.) 
Police were dispatched to the scene and began an extended search for May. 
(R., p.22.) Following a tip, police located May in Twin Falls and attempted to initiate a 
traffic stop, but May refused to pull over. (R., pp.22-23.) The police pursued May in a 
high speed car chase that reached 80 mph. (R., p.23.) Police used tire spikes to blow 
out May's right front tire in an effort to stop him, but May continued to drive. (Id.) May 
was not stopped until officers hit his car, causing him to spin out, and then other officers 
collided with the car to prevent May from leaving. (R., pp.23-24.) May still attempted to 
pull away, until police shot him in the head, bringing the car chase to an end. (Id.) 
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The state charged May with qggravated assault, aggravated battery, burglary, 
and felony eluding. (R., pp.101-04.) The state also filed notice of its intent to seek a 
weapon enhancement. (R., pp.102-03.) After extensive negotiations, May entered a 
plea agreement with prosecutors pursuant to which May pied guilty to the aggravated 
battery and misdemeanor eluding, and the state agreed to dismiss the remaining 
charges and recommend a unified sentence of 30 years with ten years fixed. (R., 
pp.242, 244-47; 1/27/2011 Tr., p.19, L.25 - p.21, L.16 (attached as exhibit)). 
More than a month later but prior to sentencing, May, with the assistance of new 
counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea with accompanying brief, alleging 
that he was placed under undue pressure from his prior attorney to accept 
the plea negotiation and enter into the guilty plea notwithstanding the fact 
that he did not want to[,] ... that he did not fully understand what he was 
doing and the repercussions[, and] ... that he did not have enough time to 
speak with his prior attorney about the negotiation and the guilty plea. 
(R., pp.264-71.) May also filed an affidavit in support of his motion. (R., pp.280-82.) 
The state objected to the motion to withdraw (R., pp.284-89), and the motion was set for 
a hearing (R., p.292). 
After the hearing, the district court denied May's motion to withdraw, finding that 
May's testimony was not credible and that May failed to show a just reason for 
withdrawal. (See Tr., pp.94-114; see also R., pp.303-04.) The district court entered 
judgment and imposed the recommended sentence of 30 years with ten years fixed for 
aggravated battery with a weapon enhancement. (R., pp.323-28.) May filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (R., pp.330-32.) 
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ISSUE 
May states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. May's 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has May failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of 
his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
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ARGUMENT 
May Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In Denying His 
Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
May asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-11.) Specifically, May contends that his 
unsupported testimony that he was coerced by his attorney into pleading guilty and that 
he did not comprehend the definition of an "indeterminate sentence" established just 
reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. (Id., pp.10-11.) The district court, however, 
found that May's testimony was not credible, and the record supports the court's 
determination that May failed to show any just reason for withdrawal. May has failed to 
establish an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from 
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780-781 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. 
App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are 
supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 
1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. May Failed To Demonstrate A Just Reason For Withdrawing His Guflty Plea 
May filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. (R., p.264.) 
"When a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made before sentencing, a defendant need 
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only demonstrate 'just reason' for withdrawal of the plea." State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 
330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Arthur, 145 
Idaho 219, 222, 177 P.3d 966, 969 (2008); State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801, 761 
P.2d 1151, 1153 (1998)). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating a 
justification for withdrawal of his guilty plea. Stone, 147 Idaho at 333, 208 P.3d at 737 
(citing State v. Nath, 141 Idaho 584, 586, 114 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. 
Acevedo, 131 Idaho 513, 516, 960 P .2d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Medina, 128 
Idaho 19, 25, 909 P.2d 637, 643 (Ct. App. 1996)). May failed to meet his burden of 
demonstrating a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. 
In his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, May claimed: 
that he was placed under undue pressure from his prior attorney to accept 
the plea negotiation and enter into the guilty plea notwithstanding the fact 
that he did not want to[,] ... that he did not fully understand what he was 
doing and the repercussions[, and] ... that he did not have enough time to 
speak with his prior attorney about the negotiation and the guilty plea. 
(R., p.271.) 
The district court held a hearing on May's motion where both May and his prior 
counsel testified, and the plea agreement, transcript from the change of plea hearing, 
and the recording of a phone conversation between May and his mother were entered 
into evidence as exhibits. (See, generally, Tr.) After the evidentiary phase of the 
hearing, the district court engaged in a detailed factual analysis and presented its 
findings on the record. (Tr., p.94, L.19 - p.106, L.18.) Those findings are attached to 
this brief as "Appendix A." After enumerating several of the discrepancies and 
inconsistencies in May's testimony, the district court found that May was not credible 
and instead credited the testimony of his prior counsel. (Tr., p.105, L.22 - p.106, L.18.) 
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The district court, therefore, concluded that May failed to carry his burden of proving 
facts that would constitute a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea, and properly 
exercised its discretion by denying May's motion. 
On appeal, May argues that his testimony alone provided a just reason to 
withdraw his guilty plea and that the district court's finding that May's testimony was not 
credible was clearly erroneous in light of the contemporaneous phone call he made to 
his mother. (Appellant's brief, p.10.) May's argument lacks merit. After entering into 
the plea agreement, May called his mother that evening to celebrate the deal. She was 
not pleased that he had entered any plea agreement without her present, and he had to 
explain why it was a positive deal. The district court listened to the recording of that 
conversation, and found that May, contrary to his testimony offered during the hearing 
that he had been coerced into accepting the bargain, had expressed satisfaction with 
his prior counsel's representation. (Tr., p.106, Ls.4-11.) The power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses is the sole province of the trier of fact, and appellate courts will 
not usurp that authority. See State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 1235 
(2003); State v. Jones, 145 Idaho 639,641, 181 P.3d 1247, 1249 (Ct. App. 2008). The 
trier of fact, in this case the district court, after hearing the testimony offered by both 
May and his prior counsel, and reviewing the exhibits which included the recording of 
the phone call, found May's testimony not credible and credited the testimony of his 
prior counsel. (See Appendix A.) 
May also argues that the district court abused its discretion by considering 
standards applied in federal cases for an identical federal rule when determining that 
May failed to establish a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, 
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p.11.) May is estopped from making this argument as it was May's substitute counsel 
that originally asserted that the federal standard was relevant to his case. (See R., 
pp.270-71.) If the district court erred in considering the federal standard in determining 
whether May had established a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea, that error 
was invited. See State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Even were this Court to conclude application of federal case law was not invited 
by May, May's argument that the district court abused its discretion by considering 
federal legal standards for withdrawal of a guilty plea still fails. The district court 
recognized that denying May's motion was within its discretion, acted within the bounds 
of that discretion, and exercised reason in denying May's motion. (See Tr., p.106, L.21 
- p.114, L.12.) As part of that exercise of discretion, the district court considered a six 
factor analysis adopted by a federal court in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (4th 
Cir. 1991), for guidance in making its determination. (Tr., p.108, L.15 - p.109, L.7; 
p.111, L.14 - p.113, L.18.) The six factors adopted in Moore were: 
(1) whether the defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea was 
not knowing or not voluntary, (2) whether the defendant has credibly 
asserted his legal innocence, (3) whether there has been a delay between 
the entering of the plea and the filing of the motion, (4) whether defendant 
has had close assistance of competent counsel, (5) whether withdrawal 
will cause prejudice to the government, and (6) whether it will 
inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources. 
Moore, 931 F.2d at 248 (citing United State v. Hurtado, 846 F.2d 995, 997 (5th Cir. 
1988); United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Kobrosky, 711 F.2d 449, 455-56 (1st Cir. 1983)). May has failed to show that anything 
in the Moore standard conflicts with Idaho case law. The district court, therefore, cannot 
7 
be said to have abused its discretion by considering relevant factors when reaching its 
reasoned determination. 
May failed to meet his burden of showing any just reason to withdraw his guilty 
plea. The district court, therefore, properly exercised its discretion by denying May's 
motion to withdraw his plea. May has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's 
discretion. The judgment of the district court should therefore be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of 
May's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
DATED this 27th day of February, 2012. 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of February, 2012, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
SPENCERJ.HAHN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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1 simply a statement by the state which is told to 
2 the defendant; and, therefore, Mr. Andersen 
3 didn't coerce him. 
4 Throughout the Rule 11 colloquy as well 
5 as answering the questions in the guilty plea 
6 advisory form, he was asked over and over and 
7 over again if he was satisfied with 
8 Mr. Andersen's representation; and he Indicated 
9 he did. And then during talking to the judge, 
10 he said he was not forced, he was not 
11 threatened, and he did not feel like he was 
12 making this decision under any kind of coercion. 
13 In fact, on the stand this defendant has told 
14 this court the reason he wanted to plead guilty 
15 is he wanted to take advantage of the plea 
16 agreement, which Is, the state will ask for 10, 
17 but you can argue for less. And so he wanted to 
18 take that plea, he wanted to enter that plea; 
19 and It wasn't for almost two and a half weeks 
20 that he finally determined that he did not want 
21 to take that plea and that he didn't understand 
22 that he could serve 30 years, even though he 
23 told the judge he did. 
24 We would ask the court to find that this 
25 plea was voluntary and knowingly entered by this 
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1 (3:16 p.m. Reconvene.) 
2 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. Be seated, 
4 please. We are back on record at 3: 16 on the 
5 digital clock in the courtroom, again on 
6 CR 2010-6208. Mr. Williams, Mr. May, and 
7 Ms. Sturgill are present. 
B Counsel, did anything come up In this 
9 recess that you wish to point out or make note 
10 of prior to my ruling? 
11 MR. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor. 
12 MS. STURGILL: No, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Very well. The court then, 
14 based on what I have heard today, yesterday and 
15 today, considering the motion and affidavit 
16 before me, I will enter the following ruling and 
17 findings of fact in this case and conclusions of 
18 law: 
19 First of all, as to the findings of fact 
20 that I make, on January 27, 2011, the defendant 
21 entered pleas of guilty to two charges: 
22 aggravated battery with an enhancement for the 
23 use of a deadly weapon and misdemeanor alluding. 
24 On the day of his change of plea, the 
25 defendant had met three times with his counsel, 
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1 defendant and ask that the court deny his 
2 motion. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel, do 
4 either of you have Exhibit 1? 
5 MS. STURGILL: It's right there. 
6 THE COURT: Would you mind providing that 
7 to the court. 
8 Mr. Williams, your rebuttal, sir. 
9 MR. WILLIAMS: That doesn't bring up 
10 anything further. 
11 THE COURT: What I would like to do, 
12 folks, Is take a few minutes to digest what I 
13 have heard today as well as yesterday, put my 
14 thoughts together, and then Issue my ruling. 
15 Let's say I'll do that at 3: 15. I also have one 
16 other case to take care of In that interim as 
17 well. So we will be in recess in this case 
18 untll 3: 15 when I issue my ruling. Okay? 
19 Thank you. 







1 Benjamin Andersen, that day alone. During the 
2 final visit, Andersen provided a plea agreement 
3 which Is -- and has been admitted as Exhibit 1. 
4 During the day on the 27th, the defendant also 
5 completed a written guilty plea questionnaire, 
6 by lnitlalling each of ten pages and signing the 
7 last two. 
8 During this court's colloquy with 
9 Mr. May, he affirmatively represented to the 
10 court the following: He understood the purpose 
11 for the court's asking him questions under oath. 
12 He has a high school diploma and some college 
13 education at CSI. He understands the nature of 
14 an aggravated battery charge and what it takes r 
15 to commit the crime and the maximum penaltles.. . . j 
16 He was not laboring under any mental or 
17 psychological problems at the time of the change [ 
18 of plea hearing. Nothing was going on In his 
19 llfe that would affect his ability to make a 
20 reasoned and informed decision. He understood [ 
21 that, by pleading guilty, he gave up all 
22 defenses he might have to the charges. There is 
23 nothing he wanted Mr. Andersen to do to help [ 
24 with his case that Mr. Andersen had not already 
25 done. He was satisfied with Mr. Andersen's 
95 I 
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I 1 representation. He went over discovery with 1 county jail term for the eluding charge. Do you 
2 Mr. Andersen and requested no additional 2 understand, based on your plea, that the court 
i 3 discovery. I\Jo one forced him or threatened him 3 isn't bound to follow that recommendation?" 
/ 4 In any way to plead guilty. He initialed each 4 Answer given: ''Yes, sir." 
5 page of the guilty plea advisory form and signed 5 "That your sentence could be up to 
I 6 the last two pages, as already noted. He also 6 30 years in prison, with a unified fixed time 
, 7 did not feel that he was under any coercion from 7 exceedin,g the 10 years, up to 30 years fixed 
s any source whatsoever in pleading guilty. The 8 without the eligibility for parole?" 
7 9 responses in the written guilty plea 9 Answer: "Yes, sir." 
! 10 questionnaire are the same answers he would have 10 That's the end of the quote. 
11 given the court if the court asked him any of 11 The defendant gave a factual basis for 
l 12 those questions while he was under oath on that 12 the crime, admitting guilt for the charge of 
i 
13 date. 13 aggravated battery. 
14 The court explained that the defendant 14 I quote again from the transcript from 
[ 15 waived the right to appeal, quote, if I follow 15 his own words: "I fired a firearm, and James 
16 the state's recommendation of a 10-year fixed or 16 Lambert got hit in the leg." 
17 do something less than that, end of quote, and 17 The court then questioned: "And the 
I 18 the defendant indicated that he understood. The 18 bullet actually struck him in the leg?" 
19 court had the following colloquy with the 
I 
20 defendant, which I quote from the transcript: 








22 agreement. It recommends, or the state will 
recommend, a sentence of 30 years, with 10 years 











the penitentiary, with a concurrent 6-month 
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The questionnaire establishes the 
following, based upon responses given personally 
by the defendant, and I'm quoting or referencing 
primarily here, not the questionnaire but the 
colloquy from Mr. May: 
19 Answer: "I believe so." 
20 The defendant further admitted during 
21 that colloquy to using a pistol to shoot 
22 Mr. Lambert. He gave a further factual basis 
23 for the misdemeanor alluding, admitting driving 
24 a car, hearing lights and sirens, and that he 
25 didn't pull over. 
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1 The defendant understood the plea agreement and 
2 indicated there was nothing about It he didn't 
3 understand. The plea agreement was acceptable 
4 to the defendant, and no one had told him what 
5 his sentence would be. The defendant reserved 
6 the right to appeal but only if the court 
7 exceeded the fixed time recommended by the 
l 8 
The defendant understood the questions 
asked of him in the form. The defendant asked 
Mr. Andersen to resolve any questions that he 
had. The form includes, "30Y, lSK," as the 
penalty for the aggravated battery. The court 
inquired whether this meant 30 years, and the 
defendant agreed. The defendant Indicated that 
he did not have any motions that he wanted 
filed. The court asked about this specifically, 
8 state. The defendant needed no additional time 































and the defendant indicated he had no motions to 
file. The defendant indicated he had no 
witnesses available who would show his 
innocence. The defendant had adequate time to 
fill out the form. The defendant had adequate 
access to his attorney for Andersen's assistance 
in completing the form. Mr. Andersen adequately 
investigated his case, and there were no 
additional items needed before entering a guilty 
plea. There were no motions to be filed in the 
case. The defendant read the plea agreement. 
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10 understood that no one, including his attorney, 
11 could make him piead guilty. 
12 In bold and underlined font, the 
13 defendant answered "yes" to the following 
14 question, Number 88, "Do you understand that, if 
15 the court accepts your gullty pleas, that you 
16 may not be able to withdraw your pleas at a 
17 later date?" 
18 The defendant further acknowledged, "I 
19 have answered the questions on pages 1 through 
20 10 of this guilty plea advisory form truthfully, 
21 understand all of the questions and answers 
22 herein, have discussed each question and answer 
23 with my attomey, and have completed this form 
24 freely and voluntarily," the following then in 
25 all caps again, "with a complete understanding 
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1 of the charges to which I am pleading guilty and 
2 with knowledge of the potential consequences of 
3 this plea." That's the end of all caps. 
4 "Furthermore, no one has forced me or threatened 
5 me to plead guilty." 
6 Upon the defendant's return to jail then, 
7 alter pleading guilty, he testified that he had 
8 discussions with Inmates who were critical of 
9 his accepting the plea offer. The defendant 
10 claims that he only then understood that the 
11 term 10 years fixed meant what it said. The 
12 court rejects this testimony from yesterday's 
13 hearing. The court concludes that the defendant 
14 knew very well what he was doing when he pied 
15 guilty and when his plea was accepted. 
16 The.record establishes and this court 
17 already found that the defendant entered his 
18 plea with knowledge of the nature of the charges 
19 to which he pied guilty, with an understanding 
20 of the potential penalties, and his plea was 
21 entered knowingly and voluntarily, that he 
22 committed the crimes to which he pied guilty. 
23 During the plea colloquy, the defendant was 
24 asked whether he agreed with those findings, and 
25 he indicated that he agreed. 
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1 change of plea, when Mr. May entered his guilty 
2 plea, and received an assurance from 
3 Mr. Andersen at least that the relationship was 
4 workable. 
5 Andersen discussed several different 
6 scenarios during his testimony today that the 
7 defendant and Andersen had discussed throughout 
8 his representation regarding potential sentences 
9 and negotiations. The use of fixed and 
10 indeterminate time was used extensively In those 
11 conversations, and the defendant never indicated 
12 that he didn't understand the meaning of those 
13 terms during multiple meetings he had with 
14 Andersen. 
15 Mr. Andersen indicated that he was trying 
16 to get Mr. May to accept a 10-year fixed 
17 recommendation. Mr. May had come up to 8 years 
18 and eventually said he was willing to do 8 
19 · fixed, or 8 on the bottom, to quote 
20 Mr. Andersen, and that he didn't care about the 
21 top. The court concludes from this testimony 
22 that May clearly understood the difference 
23 between bottom and top, fixed and Indeterminate 
24 time. They spoke about indeterminate, according 
25 to Mr. Andersen, 50 to a hundred times. 
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1 The court continues to maintain those 
2 findings today. Nothing In this record 
3 establishes that the plea entered by the 
4 defendant was anything but knowing, voluntarily, 
5 and intelligently given. The defendant has a 
6 college education. His testimony about not 
7 understanding legal terms or not understanding 
8 the nature of the agreement is simply 
9 unsupportable, and this court does not accept 
10 his testimony In this regard. 
11 The defendant seeks to withdraw his plea 
12 based upon alleged coercion by his attorney, 
13 Benjamin Andersen. This court has several 
14 years' experience with Mr. Andersen In this 
15 courtroom. The court heard from him today, 
16 indicating he's been a public defender In this 
17 county for over seven years. He, Mr. Andersen, 
18 was appointed on June 2nd, 2010. 
19 The court accepts his testimony as 
20 follows: He met with Mr. May approximately 
21 30 times. His relationship with Mr. May was off 
22 and on. It was discussed with this court on one 
23 occasion, wherein Andersen was retained as 
24 counsel after this court's hearing. This court 
25 also Inquired specifically in that regard at the 
101 
1 Everything he did seemed to know, that is, 
2 Mr. May, that he knew what indeterminate meant. 
3 He was concerned about making parole if 
4 he got into fights and so forth. Andersen and 
5 Mr. May spoke about the sentencing numbers for a 
6 significant amount of time, although a specific 
7 hour or day number was not given. The 
8 discussion regarding Exhibit 1, the specific 
9 plea offer, was only 15 minutes. Overall, 
10 Mr. May and Andersen spent hours and hours going 
11 over fixed, indeterminate, parole issues, and 
12 matters that could make parole difficult, 
13 Including fighting with Bubba. 
14 On January 27th, Andersen went through 
·15 the offer and guilty plea questionnaire with the 
16 defendant for approximately 20 minutes. Mr. May 
17 filled out the form. Andersen did not. 
18 Andersen never conveyed a likely 65-year 
19 sentence. He did indicate that Mr. May could 
20 not be sentenced for multiple enhancements If 
21 the court determined that the conduct was one 
22 course of continuous events. 
23 Mr. Andersen testified that he never 
24 described himself and the prosecution as we, 
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f 1 didn't enter a plea, he would make sure May 
2 would get 65 years. Mr. May was a very hands-on 
: 3 client, looking Into case law and that type of 
thing. Mr. May seemed to understand the system 
in some ways better than Mr. Andersen did. 
I 4 
5 
1 6 After the guilty plea, Mr. Andersen spoke 
i 7 with Mr. May on February 2nd, 2011, going over 
a the PSI paperwork. Nothing was discussed about 
withdrawing the plea at that time. They met 
again on the 9th of February to finish the 
paperwork, and nothing was mentioned about a 
plea withdrawal then, either. Andersen 








some point in that time frame; and Mr. May was 
dismissive about his mother's comments and told 
16 Andersen to ignore her. This type of attitude 
l 
1 17 or conduct is certainly consistent with the way 
18 Mr. May spoke to his mother on the telephone. 
i 
19 The first time May spoke about 
20 
I 21 
withdrawing his guilty plea was after the 16th 
of February when he refused to see Andersen. 
22 Mr. Andersen did receive a kite on 
I 23 
/ 24 
February 13th; and Mr. May indicated that, after 
thinking about it, he wanted to withdraw his 
25 plea, because he was threatened in entering his 
i 104 
I 1 the witness stand and the motivation he has to 
1 
2 now testify otherwise than he did previousiy 
3 under oath. 
4 The court also notes the discussion 
5 Mr. May had with his mother on the telephone the 
j 6 evening he entered the plea. He speaks of 
7 Andersen's help In terms of a tone that leads 
l 9
8 this court to believe that the defendant was 
then satisfied with Andersen's representation 
10 and that the agreement, the 10 fixed and 20 
indeterminate, was acceptabie. 
The court, therefore, concludes that 
13 Mr. May's testimony at the time of the change of 
' 14 plea hearing on January 27th was accurate, given 
! 
I 15 under oath, and is relied upon by this court. 
16 The testimony given yesterday and today seems 
i 17 more the product of second-guessing, wishful 
l 18 thinking, and/or dishonesty. 
19 I, therefore, conclude, as matters of 
: 
1 20 law, the motion to withdraw a guilty plea is 
J
I 
21 governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c). Under 
! 
22 that rule, the withdrawal of a guilty plea may 
be allowed in the trial court's discretion. The 
Court of Appeals of Idaho has further 
I 23 
i 24 
25 established that such discretion should be 
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1 plea and referenced some Indication that he was 
2 innocent. 
3 Andersen then met with Mr. May on the 
4 23rd of February, when Mr. May agreed to see 
5 him, Mr. May told Andersen he wanted to 
6 withdraw his plea and told Andersen on that 
7 occasion for the first time that he did not 
8 understand what "indeterminate time" meant. 
9 Andersen told Mr. May that It would be a mistake 
10 to file the motion and to think on it and 
11 Mr. Andersen would come see him later. 
12 Andersen saw Mr. May again on March 2nd. 
13 He went with Robin Weeks, another public 
14 defender, to see Mr. May, because Robin Weeks 
15 seems to calm people down. It didn't work. 
16 Mr. May thought they were just stringing him 
17 along and not filing what he wanted filed. He 
18 was accusing Mr. Andersen by then of tricking 
19 him Into pleading guilty; and shortly 
20 thereafter, the case was conflicted to 
21 Mr. Williams who represents Mr. May here today. 
22 Based upon the entirety of these facts, 
23 as a factual conclusion, the court thus rejects 
24 Mr. May's testimony In this courtroom as lacking 
25 support In the record based upon his demeanor on 
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1 liberally applied. 
2 In determining a matter within the 
3 court's discretion, I must first make a 
4 determination that the issue is one involving 
5 the exercise of discretion. I must act within 
6 the outer boundaries of that discretion and 
7 consistently with the legal standards applicable 
8 to. the choices available to the court. And 
9 finally, the court must reach its decision by an 
10 exercise of reason. To act within this court's 
11 discretion, I must give due consideration to the 
12 facts and circumstances of the case and 
13 correctly apply the law thereto. 
14 As applied In the context of a motion to 
15 withdraw a guilty plea, a district court should 
16 Identify conflicting factors bearing on the 
17 issues and reach a decision based on a 
18 well-reasoned consideration of those factors. 
19 The scope of this court's discretion Is 
20 thus affected by several things. One of those 
21 is the timing of the motion. Where a motion is 
22 filed before sentencing, as Mr. May's motion 
23 here is, the defendant need only show a just 
24 reason for withdrawing his plea. The court is 
25 also allowed to temper its liberallty In these 
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